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Consciousness has resisted attempts to fathom its ultimate nature. My direct aim in this 
paper is to rebut anti-physicalist arguments; but I also want to raise the possibility that 
understanding consciousness might be beyond our reach – and not for a lack of trying or 
ingenuity. 
A number of anti-physicalist arguments have been proposed during the last two decades 
that start from a premise about an epistemic, conceptual or explanatory gap between physical 
and phenomenal descriptions and conclude – on a priori grounds – that physicalism is false 
(Kripke, 1972; Nagel, 1974; Jackson, 1982; Robinson, 1993; Bealer, 1994; Chalmers, 1996, 
2009; Levine, 2001, 2007; White, 2007; Nida-Rümelin, 2007). Phenomenal descriptions feature 
phenomenal concepts that refer to token phenomenal experiences or phenomenal properties, i.e., 
qualia. Phenomenal experience is characterized by the fact that there is something it is like to 
undergo it, something one can normally introspect, e.g., there is something it is like to feel my 
body against the chair I am sitting in. Anti-physicalists conclude that phenomenal facts – e.g., the 
fact that I feel the pressure of the chair against my body right now – are absent in a purely 
physical world. 
Physicalists have come up with various different strategies to counter these arguments. 
The most promising physicalist line of defense, in my view, is based on the idea that these 
epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts 
rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this 
proposal, involve unique cognitive mechanisms, but none that could not be fully physically 
implemented. If this project is successful, it amounts to a powerful reply to the anti-physicalist 
arguments. I will call this project – following Stoljar (2005) – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
(PCS).  
David Chalmers (2007) has presented a Master Argument to show that the PCS – not just 
this or that version of it, but any version of it – fails; the basic idea is that there are a priori 
reasons to deny the possibility of the kind of phenomenal concepts this strategy requires, i.e., 
 
1 I would like to thank David Chalmers, Tamar Gendler, Barry Loewer, Raymond Martin, 
Howard Robinson, and Gilad Tanay for helpful discussions and criticism.  
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physicalistically respectable concepts that at the same time explain our epistemic situation2 with 
respect to qualia. Chalmers argues that the phenomenal concepts posited by such theories are 
either not physicalistically explicable, or they cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard 
to qualia. If he is correct then the PCS fails. In response, I argue that his Master Argument does 
not provide any new reasons to reject the PCS, that is, any reasons that go beyond those 
presented in the original anti-physicalist arguments – which the PCS is designed to rebut. I also 
argue that, although the PCS shows that the physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up 
physicalism in the light of the anti-physicalist arguments, the anti-physicalist is not rationally 
compelled to give up the anti-physicalist argument in the light of the PCS either (see Balog, 
2008). There is a symmetry between the two positions as far as a priori considerations are 
concerned.  
 
I. Physicalism and the gaps 
 
The debate between physicalism and anti-physicalism is a debate about fundamental 
ontology. According to physicalism, the world’s fundamental ontology is physical. 
Contemporary physicalists typically hold that the best account of that ontology is provided by 
fundamental physics. Physics’ best hypotheses about fundamental ontology is that it consists of 
elementary particles, strings and/or fields occupying a space-time structure, and possessing a 
limited number of quantitative properties (mass, charge, electromagnetic potential, and so on). 
Physics also claims that there are only a few fundamental dynamical and perhaps non-dynamical 
laws that govern the structure of space-time and the evolution of its occupants. It is not easy to 
say exactly what makes fundamental entities and properties “physical.” But this isn’t a problem 
since it suffices for our discussion that physicalism is understood as requiring that fundamental 
physical properties and entities and micro-systems composed of them are “non-mental.” So if 
physicalism is true then micro-systems (e.g. individual molecules) do not possess intentionality 
or phenomenal consciousness (or proto intentionality and phenomenality). If physicalism is true 
and if intentionality and consciousness is instantiated then they are instantiated only in 
macroscopic systems in virtue of complex arrangements of fundamental properties and entities 
and their causal/nomological features; in actual reality, they are instantiated in biological 
individuals in virtue of brain states and processes. 
Following Frank Jackson, I will assume that there is a fundamental vocabulary (although 
not necessarily in our language as it is currently) in which there is a complete fundamental true 
description of the world. This description specifies the total spatio-temporal distribution of 
fundamental entities, the totality of instantiations of fundamental properties and relations, and the 
fundamental laws. If physicalism is true then none of the elementary vocabulary refers to mental 
 
2 “Epistemic situation” is used by Chalmers (2007) in a technical sense that I will explain later. 
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entities or properties. Jackson pointed out that a necessary condition for the truth of physicalism 
is that all positive truths,3 including positive truths about phenomenal consciousness, are 
metaphysically necessitated by the complete physical truth.4 Jackson calls this the Physicalist 
Entailment Thesis  
(Phys) T□ (P  T).5  
 
It follows that if there are positive phenomenal truths – for example, that Mary knows what it is 
like to see red – that are not necessitated by the complete physical description of our world then 
physicalism is false. 
Let Q be any positive phenomenal truth. The anti-physicalist arguments start from a 
premise that there is an epistemic gap between P and Q. Chalmers (1996, 2009), for example, 
claims that there is a conceptual gap between P and Q. He claims that P&~Q is conceivable,6 
i.e., that zombies – creatures that are our physical duplicates but lack some or all of our 
 
3 A positive phenomenal statement says that a phenomenal property is instantiated; e.g., Joe is 
feeling an itch. Negative truths, like There are no angels, and global statements, like Every gold 
cube has a volume smaller that one cubic centimeter, are not metaphysically necessitated by the 
complete physical truth about the world P although they are necessitated by P and a clause that 
says that P is the whole fundamental truth. However, the phenomenal and physical truths we will 
be interested in are all positive truths so I will ignore this complication for the remainder of the 
paper.  
 
4 This formulation is based on Jackson (1993). The first precise formulation of physicalism along 
these lines is due to Lewis (1983). Subsequent discussions are variations on the same theme. 
Many philosophers, among them non-physicalists, accept this formulation as capturing a very 
important component of the intuitive idea of physicalism. But it doesn't express the full 
physicalist commitment – only a necessary condition – because it is apparently compatible with 
certain ontologies that are intuitively non-physicalist e.g., with one in which there are 
fundamental mental as well as fundamental physical properties connected by “brute” necessary 
connections.  
5  is a substitutional quantifier, T is a statement variable for true positive statements,   is the 
metaphysical necessity operator, and P is the complete fundamental physical truth, including the 
fundamental physical laws. 
6 A statement S is conceivable iff it cannot be ruled out a priori. Chalmers (2002a) distinguishes 
between several different notions of conceivability, but, since these distinctions do not affect the 
arguments of this paper, I will stay with this basic definition.  
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phenomenal experiences – are conceivable.7 Chalmers uses this claim to argue that P&~Q is 
possible, i.e., that phenomenal facts are not necessitated by the physical facts. If so, physicalism 
is false. 
P&~Q is supposedly different from all other instances of P&~T which involve only non-
phenomenal concepts, e.g, concepts like WATER, LIQUIDITY, etc. and even name concepts 
like CICERO. Chalmers (1996) claims that these concepts are associated a priori with 
descriptions (e.g. “transparent potable liquid…”, “the Roman orator who is at the origin of a 
causal chain culminating in this token”) and these connections are sufficient to obtain a priori 
entailments from P to all positive non-phenomenal statements of fact.8 Of course, these are 
contentious claims about the semantics of WATER and CICERO. Block and Stalnaker (1999) 
and McLaughlin (2007), for example, argue that these entailments are not a priori even for 
positive non-phenomenal statements. However, one needs to subscribe to this semantics to take 
the conceivability argument seriously; so I am going along with this semantics for the sake of 
argument. 
Levine (2001, ch. 3) formulates – though doesn’t endorse – another, related argument, the 
Gap Argument. It is based on the observation that no amount of knowledge about the physical 
facts (brain functioning and so on), and the physical and psycho-physical laws, is sufficient to 
explain why a particular brain state/process has a particular feel, e.g. feels giddy. Whatever 
causal/functional/physical information we have about the brain processes that underlie 
phenomenal experience – i.e. about the neurophysiological, functional, or representation features 
of phenomenal experience – the fact that such experience has a distinct phenomenal character 
might remain unexplained. In contrast, all facts about water (that it is transparent, potable, etc.) 
are explicable in terms of facts about H2O, together with physical and chemical laws. Nothing 
 
 
7 Many physicalists, me included, accept this. However, some physicalists deny it. They think 
that phenomenal concepts can be analyzed in terms of functional role or representational 
character. Pain, e.g., according the analytic functionalism, has a conceptual role that connects it 
(in the meaning-constituting way) with complex concepts like typically caused by injury, 
typically causes avoidance behavior, typically causes saying “ouch”, etc. Analytic functionalism 
or representationalism rebuts the anti-physicalist arguments by denying the conceptual, 
epistemic, and explanatory gaps between physical and phenomenal descriptions. Analytic 
functionalism/representationalism, of course, has to explain why there seem to be such epistemic 
gaps when in reality there aren’t. See also Kirk (2005) for an interesting argument against the 
conceivability of zombies whose grounds go beyond analytic functionalism. 
 
8 Chalmers and Jackson in (2001) are a little more cautious; they only assert that all positive 
statements are a priori derivable from the full fundamental description of the world, whether or 
not that involves fundamental mental facts as well.  
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seems to be left out by such an explanation. Since we can’t explain in the same way why a brain 
state feels giddy there is an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal descriptions, i.e., 
there is an explanatory gap between P and Q. The problem is related to the conceivability of 
zombies, but it can be stated without appealing to conceivability, or any thesis linking 
conceivability and possibility, and so has the advantage that it doesn’t rely on any substantial 
assumptions about concepts and conceptual truths. It only relies on a contrast between the 
comprehensibility of the hypothesis that phenomenal consciousness is non-physical and the 
incomprehensibility of corresponding hypotheses involving properties figuring in the other 
special sciences, e.g., that water is not H2O.9 
Anti-physicalists argue that these epistemic gaps, together with some plausible – 
putatively a priori – principles imply that there is an ontological gap between the physical and 
the phenomenal. They hold that purely physical worlds are devoid of phenomenally conscious 
states and beings. Here is Chalmers’ argument:10 
 
The Zombie Argument 
 
1) P&~Q is conceivable.  
2) If P&~Q is conceivable then P&~Q is metaphysically possible. 
3) If P&~Q is metaphysically possible then physicalism is false.11 
________  
4) Physicalism is false. 
 
The PCS is based on the core idea that the conceptual and epistemic gaps are due not to 
the nature of qualia but rather the nature of the concepts in terms of which we think about qualia. 
The key factor is that the explanation on offer is claimed to be compatible with physicalism. By 
providing a clear conception of how the key conceptual/ epistemic facts –the conceivability of 
zombies, the explanatory gap, etc. – can hold in a purely physicalistic world the physicalist has 
 
9 Block and Stalnaker (1999) discuss the possibility of ‘ghost water’ – a non-physical kind that 
exists side by side with being composed of hydrogen and oxygen atoms and has all the same 
causal roles as the latter. Even if that is conceivable, one would suppose that “water” in this 
scenario would refer to both H2O and ghost water and not to ghost water alone. So one couldn’t 
argue that in this case water would be identical with ghost water (and not H2O). 
  
10 Chalmers (2009) introduces some clarifications and emendations to this argument. None of 
them plays a role in the arguments that follows so I stay with this simple formulation. 
 
11 This follows directly from Phys: if P&~Q is possible, it is not true that for all true positive 
statements T, □ (P  T). 
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demonstrated that the a priori premise of the anti-physicalist arguments linking the epistemic 
gaps to ontological gaps is conceivably false. Such a premise is – if true – a priori true, so if it is 
conceivable false, it is false. The PCS shows that the conceptual/epistemic gaps do not a priori 
require an anti-physicalist explanation. The PCS provides an alternative – physicalist – 
explanatory scheme for those facts.12 
 
 
II. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
Phenomenal concepts have a number of unique features. The sense that there is 
something special about phenomenal concepts is very closely connected to features of the 
epistemic access they afford to qualia. When we deploy phenomenal concepts introspectively to 
some phenomenally conscious experience as it occurs, say a phenomenal experience of the color 
blue, we are said to be acquainted13 with our experience. While philosophers have understood 
‘acquaintance’ in various ways, it is generally taken to be a unique epistemological relation that 
relates a person to her own mental states directly and, according to some, in a way that reveals 
the essence of the referent. Such a relation has struck many philosophers as deeply puzzling. The 
version of the PCS I advocate – the constitutional account of phenomenal concepts (Hill and 
McLaughlin, 1999; Block, 2007; Papineau, 2002, 2007; Balog, 2011) – accounts for these 
features in a way compatible with physicalism.14  
On the constitutional account, there is an intimate relation between phenomenal concepts 
and their referents; token experiences serve as modes of presentation of the phenomenal 
 
12 I will only directly address the conceivability of zombies and the explanatory gap; but it can be 
shown that the PCS addresses all the other conceptual/epistemic gaps and so all the other anti-
physicalist arguments based on the existence of these gaps. 
 
13 The term ‘acquaintance’ was introduced in this context by Bertrand Russell. Russell (1910) 
developed his famous distinction between ‘knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description.’ He then went on, in his (1918/1919) lectures on logical atomism, to argue, in a 
Cartesian manner, that we are only ever acquainted with ‘sensibilia’; roughly, our phenomenal 
experiences.  
 
14 Chalmers (2003) also proposed a version of the constitutional account; naturally, his account is 
not in the service of rebutting the anti-physicalist arguments. There are other proposals that fall 
under the general umbrella of the PCS. Not all of these proposals acknowledge the direct and 
substantial manner in which seem to grasp the essence of our own phenomenal states. They 
include recognitional accounts (Tye, 2003), demonstrative accounts (Levin, 2007; Perry, 2001), 
and information-theoretical accounts (Aydede & Güzeldere, 2005). 
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properties they instantiate.15 In the case of most concepts, e.g., the concept WATER, it doesn’t 
matter exactly what neural configurations constitute a particular token of WATER as long as the 
requisite causal/informational relations between it and water holds. But in the case of 
phenomenal concepts, e.g., the concept PAIN, constitution matters for reference, both in terms of 
reference fixing, and in terms of how the concept cognitively presents its reference. More 
precisely, on this view, every token of a phenomenal concept applied to current experience is 
(partly) constituted by that token experience, and this fact is crucial in determining the reference 
of the concept. Not only is it the case that a token experience that constitutes a token phenomenal 
concept instantiates the phenomenal property the concept refers to, but it is because the concept 
is so constituted that it so refers. There are, of course, applications of phenomenal concepts that 
are, on this theory, not constituted by token experiences; e.g., applications of phenomenal 
concepts to one’s past or future experience, to other peoples’ experiences, etc. But the canonical, 
first person, present tense applications are always so constituted and the other applications are 
dependent on the first person applications.16 
If this account is true it explains acquaintance with our experience in a manner that 
doesn’t appeal to non-physicalistic metaphysics.17 It similarly helps explain the epistemic gaps 
that the anti-physicalist arguments are based on. First of all, the constitutional account explains 
how we can grasp the essence of phenomenal properties even while this grasp is direct, that is, 
unmediated by physical or functional modes of presentation. On this account, in the canonical 
applications of a phenomenal concept an instance of the referent is literally (physically) present 
in the concept, therefore there will be always something it is like to token the concept in those 
applications.18 Undergoing an experience that instantiates the referent reveals something 
essential about the referent in a particularly vivid manner, namely, it reveals what it is like to 
have it. This means that phenomenal concepts provide grasp of the phenomenal properties they 
refer to in a way that reveals their essence. And because, according to the theory, tokens of 
 
15 In what follows I concentrate on phenomenal concepts that refer to phenomenal properties; but 
the account can be easily modified to apply to concepts that refer to particular tokens of 
phenomenal properties.  
 
16 Such “indirect” applications of phenomenal concepts stand in an intricate conceptual relation 
with the “direct”, first person present tense applications. For an account, see (Balog 2011).  
 
17 I argue elsewhere (Balog 2011) that all the other unique features of our epistemic relation to 
phenomenal experience – incorrigibility, asymmetric access, transparency, fineness of grain, 
semantic stability, etc. – can be explained by the account as well. 
 
18 Levine (2006, 2007) is critical of this approach. He argues that it is impossible to explain 
cognitive presence by physical presence.  
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phenomenal concepts present their referent as the property whose token they incorporate – and 
not via any functional or physical description – they will refer to phenomenal properties directly, 
as well as substantively.  
The constitutional account can now be marshaled to account for the epistemic gaps that 
drive the conceivability arguments. 
 
i) The  conceivability of zombies is explained by the directness of our phenomenal 
concepts which, under the constitutional account, is compatible with physicalism. The directness 
of phenomenal concepts follows, as observed above, from the fact that the reference of a 
phenomenal concept is determined by how it is constituted and not by any description that is 
associated a priori with the concept. We can see that phenomenal concepts on the constitutional 
account work quite differently from other concepts. Their directness ensures that the zombie-
scenario cannot be ruled out a priori, and so is conceivable.19  This explanation is perfectly 
compatible with a physicalist – as well as a dualist – metaphysics. 
 
ii) The explanatory gap. Recall that the explanatory gap problem is that no amount of 
knowledge about the physical facts (brain functioning and so on) is sufficient to explain why a 
particular brain state has a particular feel, e.g., feels giddy. This contrasts with the way that the 
properties of water, e.g., its transparency, liquidity, etc. can be explained by the fact that water is 
composed of H2O molecules together with physical and chemical laws. Once we have an 
explanation of why H2O behaves in watery ways we have an explanation of why water is H2O. 
Since we can’t explain why a brain state feels giddy in neurophysiological terms, we can’t close 
the physical-phenomenal gap. You can see why this is in the following way. In the case of water 
and H2O, the hypothesis that water is H2O is quite natural in the light of all we know about H2O 
and the laws that govern the behavior of H2O – indeed, the hypothesis that water is not H2O but 
is merely nomologically correlated with it doesn’t even make sense. In other words, the 
hypothesis that the processes involving H2O molecules are only nomologically correlated to the 
non-physical and non-chemical processes involving water is a non-starter.20 On the other hand, 
 
19 Nota bene: I am not denying that there are inferential links between thoughts involving direct 
phenomenal concepts that are individuative of them. I think it is quite plausible that there are 
conceptual links, even perhaps concept individuative conceptual links between direct 
phenomenal concepts such as we apply to our own occurrent phenomenal experience on the one 
hand, and indirect phenomenal concepts such as we apply to other people’s phenomenal 
experiences. Perhaps there are links to other mental concepts as well. My point is that to the 
extent that these are a priori they are not of the sort that enables one to rule out a priori the 
zombie-scenario. The kicker for the physicalist is that this explanation of the conceivability of 
zombies is perfectly compatible with physicalism. 
 
20 Block and Stalnaker (1999) discuss the possibility of ‘ghost water’ – a non-physical kind that 
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the hypothesis that a phenomenal state is identical with a certain neurophysiological/functional 
state of the brain is just as compatible with our evidence as the opposing view. The hypothesis – 
endorsed by certain dualists – that phenomenal states and brain states are merely nomologically 
correlated makes perfect sense.  
The difference is that while in the case of water we do not have any special access to its 
nature and properties that is not based on physical or functional information,21 in the case of 
phenomenality we think we do. We do seem to have a special insight into the ultimate nature of 
phenomenal experience; and that nature doesn’t seem captured or exhausted by any physical or 
functional description. As far as we know, that nature might elude any physical understanding. 
Notice that I stated the problem of the explanatory gap in a way that is independent of whether 
one subscribes to the semantic thesis discussed in the previous subsection that all but 
phenomenal terms have physical/functional analyses. It is significant that this can be done since 
it demonstrates that not all of the puzzles of consciousness will go away if we simply deny the 
semantic framework of the Zombie Argument. However, the constitutional account can explain 
why the explanatory gap arises, and it does so again in a way that is compatible with 
physicalism. 
The constitutional account explains the gap by appealing to the direct and substantial 
grasp phenomenal concepts afford of their referent. When I focus on a phenomenal state, I have a 
“substantive“ grasp of its nature. I grasp it in terms of what it’s like to be in that state. Because 
this grasp is substantive but at the same time independent of any causal or functional information 
(unlike in the case of WATER), information about the functioning of the brain simply won’t 
explain what its like to be in that state. 
 
The PCS works like this. If we can explain the semantic/epistemic puzzles involving 
phenomenal consciousness by appeal to features of phenomenal concepts – in a manner 
compatible with physicalism – we have cast sufficient doubt on the crucial premises of the anti-
physicalist arguments that link semantic/epistemic gaps with ontological gaps. However, 
Chalmers thinks that he has a further argument to rebut the PCS, in any of its forms.22 I turn to 
 
exists side by side with being composed of hydrogen and oxygen atoms and has all the same 
causal roles as the latter. Even if this is conceivable, one would want to say that in this case 
“water” would refer to both H2O and ghost water and not to ghost water alone. So even this 
scenario doesn’t make sense of the hypothesis that water and H2O are merely nomologically 
correlated.  
 
21 Except for water’s appearance properties, for example, that its surface looks shiny in a storm, 
that it presents itself in a particular way to the touch, etc. But I am not going to press this point 
here. 
 
22 In the rest of the paper, the PCS should be understood as relying on the constitutional account. 
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this argument now. 
 
III. Chalmers’ criticism of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
 
David Chalmers’ (2007) Master Argument claims to establish that there are a priori 
reasons to rule out any account of phenomenal concepts that physicalistically explains the 
epistemic gaps between P and Q. He argues that phenomenal concepts are either not 
physicalistically explicable, or they “cannot explain our epistemic situation” with regard to 
qualia. To get this conclusion, Chalmers argues for the following two premises, providing the 
physicalist with a dilemma.  
 
If P&~C is conceivable, then C is not physically explicable. 
If P&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
 
where C stands for the claim that we possess phenomenal concepts with the relevant key feature 
(e.g., being constituted by an instance of the referent) posited by a physicalist account of 
phenomenal concepts.  
 
 There are two issues that need clarification before evaluating the argument. One is the 
question of what vocabulary C should be couched in; the other is what is meant by “epistemic 
situation” in the argument. We will take up each of these issues in turn. 
 
The content and conceptualization of C 
  
To get a better handle on Chalmers’ argument, we need to clarify an important issue here: 
conceptualization. Conceivability, in all its varieties, is a conceptual matter and so the evaluation 
of Chalmers’ premises will depend on what conceptualization of C we have in mind. According 
to the physicalist, C can be conceptualized not only using phenomenal language (CPhen) but, 
alternatively, it can be conceptualized using physical language (CPhys). Since Chalmers’ 
argument is supposed to be a reductio of the PCS, and since this distinction is needed to lay out 
the physicalist position clearly, we can assume at the outset that both CPhen and CPhys exist. Of 
course, if physicalism is right, there are many possible non-phenomenal, “physical” 
conceptualizations of the same phenomenon (e.g., C might be formulated as having concepts that 
are constituted by the same perceptual or sensory states that they refer to; or as being in a certain 
neuro-physiological, chemical, quantum-mechanical, etc., state). However, the issue of multiple 
 
This should not cause any problems since Chalmers’ Master Argument doesn’t depend on the 
details of the physicalist account. If I can defend this particular version of the PCS, I have 
rebutted the Master Argument.  
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possible physical conceptualizations of C will not make a difference in our discussion, as we will 
see shortly. 
Using this apparatus, we get the following four premises: 
 
1Phen) If  P&~CPhen is conceivable, then CPhen is not physically explicable. 
1Phys) If  P&~CPhys is conceivable, then CPhys is not physically explicable. 
 
2Phen) If P&~CPhen is not conceivable, then CPhen cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
2Phys) If P&~CPhys is not conceivable, then CPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
  
Most physicalists would hold that two of the premises, 1Phys and 2Phen are vacuously true by 
virtue of having a false antecedent. Let’s take 2Phen first: 
 
2 Phen) If P&~ CPhen is not conceivable, then CPhen cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
 
Anybody who accepts the conceivability of zombies (as I do), will have to accept the 
conceivability of “phenomenal concept zombies” (i.e., creatures that are physically identical with 
us but have no phenomenal concepts) under phenomenal conceptualizations of phenomenal 
states and phenomenal concepts, and so count 2Phen as vacuously true. How about 1Phys? 
 
1Phys) If  P&~CPhys is conceivable, then CPhys is not physically explicable. 
 
If we take CPhys as given in fundamental physical language – and assuming CPhys is true – 1Phys is 
vacuously true. According to the physicalist, facts about phenomenal concepts are physical facts 
and so can be expressed in fundamental physical language. But because any true fundamental 
physical description of the world, e.g., CPhys, is implied by the full fundamental physical 
description of the world P, P&~CPhys is evidently not conceivable. We have to keep in mind all 
along that the PCS is premised on the idea that zombies, and “phenomenal concept zombies” are 
conceivable under phenomenal conceptualization of phenomenal states and phenomenal 
concepts, but not under physical conceptualizations of the same phenomenal states and 
phenomenal concepts.  
For non-fundamental physical (e.g., neurophysiological) formulations of C, there is a 
question as to whether P&~CPhys is conceivable (see, e.g., Block and Stalnaker, 1999). But for 
now I’ll grant that P&~CPhys is not conceivable under any non-phenomenal conceptualization of 
C. If P&~CPhys – where CPhys is, e.g., a neurophysiological truth – was conceivable, then, by 
Chalmers’ principle linking conceivability and possibility, P&~CPhys would be possible. This 
would be a reductio of the Chalmers’ Zombie Argument – assuming that one doesn’t want to be 
an anti-physicalists about neurophysiological properties – and would make the PCS unnecessary 
in the first place. So I’ll take it that the antecedent of 1Phys is false for any non-phenomenal 
conceptualization of CPhys. Since both 1Phys and 2Phen has a false antecedent, and so are true only 
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vacuously, neither of them can be used to argue against the PCS.  
On the other hand, 1Phen and 2Phys have true antecedents, and they both have a consequent 
that appears damaging for physicalism; the physicalist needs to address them seriously. My 
strategy is to embrace the apparently damaging consequents; I will argue that they are quite 
acceptable for the physicalist. Let’s take 2Phys first. Here is the anti-physicalist argument for the 
apparently damaging claim that CPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
 
2Phys) If P&~CPhys is not conceivable, then CPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
P&~CPhys is not conceivable 
____________ 
CPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
 
I believe that C has to be cast in phenomenal terms for it to explain our epistemic situation, i.e., I 
think that only CPhen explains our epistemic situation.  
I also accept the following argument to the effect that CPhen is not physically explicable: 
 
1Phen) If  P&~CPhen is conceivable, then CPhen is not physically explicable. 
P&~CPhen is conceivable 
_______ 
CPhen is not physically explicable. 
 
In other words, I accept that only CPhen can explain our epistemic situation, but CPhen is not 
physically explicable. I will devote the last section of this paper to arguing that that this 
combination of views is not a threat for physicalism. 
 
Chalmers, by contrast, thinks that accepting the claim that C is not physically explicable 
– under any conceptualization of C – would be the kiss of death for physicalism. In the light of 
this, he suggests that physicalists should cast C in non-phenomenal terms, to avoid having to 
assert the conceivability of P&~C and – via premise 1 – the consequent that C is not physically 
explicable. He holds out some hope for the physicalist to be able challenge 2 by offering both a 
special, topic neutral conceptualization of C and a topic-neutral characterization of our epistemic 
situation. I will start by explaining why I don’t think this can work for the physicalist. ```  
Chalmers recommends that the physicalist cast her account of our epistemic situation 
with respect to phenomenal states not in phenomenal, but in “quasi-phenomenal” terms. “Quasi-
phenomenal” can be analyzed topic neutrally – in the sense that its analysis won’t include 
phenomenal terms –, presumably in a psychological/epistemic vocabulary. They are, e.g., 
described as special demonstratives, or concepts whose tokens are constituted by an instance of 
their referent. The physicalist might be able to argue then, according to Chalmers, that P&~C*, 
where C* is the statement that we possess the relevant quasi-phenomenal concepts, is not 
conceivable. Quasi-phenomenal concepts include, but possibly are not exhausted by, 
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phenomenal concepts.23 
The physicalist appealing to C* would be able to avoid the first horn of the dilemma, 
since, on this interpretation, premise 1* is vacuously true. But she would have to find a way to 
deny 2*, since 2*, together with the claim that P&~C* is not conceivable, leads to the 
undesirable consequence that C* cannot explain our epistemic situation: 
 
2*) If P&~C* is not conceivable, then C* cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
 P&~C* is not conceivable 
 ____ 
 C* cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
 
To avoid this consequence, the physicalist would also have to spell out our “epistemic situation 
with respect to phenomenal states” in topic neutral terms in the hopes that C* – having been cast 
in similarly topic-neutral terms – will be able to explain it. Before we continue, we need to 
clarify the notion of “epistemic situation” Chalmers appeals to. 
 The key to understanding the role of “epistemic situation” in Chalmers’ argument is to 
understand his account of sameness of epistemic situation. Chalmers says that two thinkers are in 
the same epistemic situation with respect to their corresponding sets of beliefs iff  
 
i) the truth-values of their corresponding beliefs are the same; and  
ii) the epistemic status of their corresponding beliefs match.  
 
“Epistemic status” includes factors like whether a belief is justified or not, but Chalmers clearly 
also ties it to whether a belief provides one with “cognitively significant”, “substantial” 
knowledge, like, e.g., Mary’s belief about what it is like to see red does.  
I contend that Chalmers’ suggestion that the physicalist employ quasi-phenomenal 
concepts to explain our epistemic situation is not helpful – at least for a physicalist who accepts, 
like I do, Chalmers’ characterization of the substantiality of phenomenal beliefs and who 
understands this substantiality to be a feature of our acquaintance with phenomenal properties. 
On this understanding, the substantiality of phenomenal beliefs comes from the fact that via 
phenomenal concepts we are acquainted with phenomenal properties: we grasp them directly and 
in a way that appears to reveal their essence.24 The constitutional account explains this by 
 
23 In this way C* differs in content from both CPhen and CPhys which – on the assumption that 
physicalism is true – refers to phenomenal concepts in a purely physical vocabulary. Whereas C* 
pinpoints the relevant psychological feature as possessing quasi-phenomenal concepts, CPhys 
describes the relevant psychological features as possessing phenomenal concepts of certain sort, 
only describes them in physical, rather than phenomenal terms. 
 
24 Not all physicalists think that we are acquainted with phenomenal properties in this way. Levin 
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suggesting that an experience instantiating the phenomenal property q serves as mode of 
presentation of a particular token of the phenomenal concept Cq by being  constitutive of the 
relevant token of Cq.  
There is a delicate issue regarding the nature of acquaintance here. If phenomenal 
properties are, as the physicalist claims, physical or functional properties, then there is a clear 
sense in which acquaintance doesn’t reveal their nature. According to the constitutional account 
of phenomenal concepts, phenomenal judgments don’t reveal their referent as physical or 
functional, for the reason that they don’t analyze their referent in physical/functional terms. In 
this sense, contrary to the dualist view, they don’t reveal the nature of their referent. In another 
sense, however, they do. In the canonical, introspective applications of phenomenal concepts, the 
very phenomenal (i.e., physical or functional) property that is being introspected serves as its 
own phenomenal mode of presentation.25 To avoid this equivocation, perhaps it would be better 
for the physicalist to analyze acquaintance and the substantiality of phenomenal belief in terms 
of the phenomenal presence of the introspected properties in phenomenal judgments; and not in 
terms of our direct grasp of the essence of phenomenal properties. This is a characterization of 
acquaintance that physicalists and dualists can agree about. 
The physicalist explanation of the substantial grasp of q via Cq crucially involves the fact 
that there is something it is like to have an instance of q. This means that the constitutional 
account couldn’t be cast in physical or quasi-phenomenal terms and still explain our epistemic 
situation. C* and CPhys are both explanatorily inadequate. There is an explanatory gap between 
C* and CPhys – involving topic neutral/physical descriptions of our phenomenal concepts – on the 
one hand, and E – a statement describing our epistemic situation in terms of “acquaintance”, 
“substantial knowledge”, etc. – on the other. Neither a neurophysiological, nor a mere 
“architectural” description of phenomenal concepts – e.g. that they are constituted by instances 
of the referent – can explain the key features of acquaintance and the substantial manner in 
which we think of phenomenal properties. 
This explanatory gap mirrors the original explanatory gap between phenomenal and 
physical descriptions. Just as the original explanatory gap renders anti-physicalism about 
phenomenal experience reasonable, and even plausible, this new explanatory gap between CPhys 
(and C*) and E – and the lack of a similar gap involving Cphen – renders the view that 
phenomenal concepts involve acquaintance with irreducibly non-physical phenomenal states a 
perfectly reasonable, and even plausible one. In contrast, as we have seen, the hypothesis that 
water is an irreducibly non-physical substance – and not H2O – strikes one as non-sensical given 
 
(2007), e.g., suggests that physicalists “should reject the claim that phenomenal concepts require 
some sort of “presence” of, or “acquaintance” with …..the quality denoted, since this claim is 
backed only by the intuitions that they have already explained away.” (p.15) 
 
25 Ned Block (in conversation) puts this point by saying that acquaintance doesn’t reveal the 
essence of phenomenal properties under all their conceptualizations.  
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what we know about H2O and water.  
As a consequence, Chalmers’ suggestion to couch C in quasi-phenomenal terms is not of 
any help to the physicalist. I think the physicalist can stick to her guns and insist that C has to be 
cast in phenomenal terms –  as CPhen – to explain our epistemic situation. Chalmers argues – by 
premise 2 and by affirming that phenomenal concepts zombies are conceivable, i.e., that 
P&~CPhen is conceivable – that CPhen is not physically explicable. I agree that CPhen  is not 
physically explicable, in the same sense in which E is not explicable by CPhys, or a phenomenal 
statement Q is not explicable by any physical statement P. The reason this is so is that in all these 
cases there is an explanatory gap. I will devote the rest of the paper to showing that, though there 
is an explanatory gap between CPhen and any physical statement P, this doesn’t pose a challenge 
to the physicalist over and above the original explanatory gap between Q and P. I also argue that, 
moreover, the constitutional account of phenomenal concepts succeeds in disarming both 
explanatory gaps at the same time.  
 
IV. In Defense of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy26  
 
The notion of “explicability” involved in the claim that CPhen is not physically explicable 
is closely tied to conceivability – i.e., to the fact that P&~ CPhen is conceivable –, and the 
explanatory gap. Chalmers argues like this: 
 
Here…we are assuming nothing about the relationship between conceivability and 
possibility. It may be that creatures satisfying P&~C are metaphysically impossible. We 
are simply assuming a connection between conceivability and explanation. More 
precisely, we are assuming  a connection between conceivability and a certain sort of 
reductive explanation, the sort that is relevant here: explanation that makes transparent 
why some high-level truth obtains, given that certain low-level truths obtain…..for now, I 
will take the connection between conceivability and explanation for granted. (pp. 174-5) 
 
It seems that for Chalmers the connection between conceivability and explanation is 
straightforwardly a priori. But, as we have seen, even those who reject the connection between 
conceivability and explanation on general grounds (Block and Stalnaker, 1999; McLaughlin, 
2007) have to admit that there is a clear sense in which CPhen is not explicable by P; the sense 
that connects explanation with “non-gappiness”. I will not adjudicate between these two views. I 
will assume that explanation requires at least non-gappiness; and leave the question open if it is 
 
 
26 Papineau (2007) and Carruthers & Veillet (2007) both offer interesting defenses of the PCS in 
the face of Chalmers’ Master Argument; they pursue rather different tacks from the one I am 
going to follow in this section. 
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also connected with conceivability in the above manner. In any case, Chalmers’ Master 
Argument, couched in terms of conceivability, can be reformulated in terms of non-gappy 
explanation: 
 
1Gap)  If there is an explanatory gap between P and C then C is not physically explicable. 
2 Gap) If there is no explanatory gap between P and C then C cannot explain our epistemic 
situation. 
 
As before, these conditionals break down into two sub-principles depending on whether they 
feature CPhys or CPhen. On the reading of “explicability” I have just suggested, 1Gap is a 
straightforward tautology; it can be used to argue for the claim that CPhen is not physically 
explicable. 2Gap is also very plausible and it can be used to argue that CPhys cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. I will call the kind of explanation figuring in these conditionals – tied, via 
conceptual necessity to non-gappyness27 – perspicuous explanation. In what follows I will focus 
on this – less controversial, and so stronger – formulation of Chalmers’ Master Argument. 
Everything I say about it applies – mutatis mutandis – to the more controversial formulation 
Chalmers originally proposed.  
Here is my answer to the Master Argument. Yes, it is correct both that CPhen is not 
physically explicable and that CPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation – but this is perfectly 
compatible with physicalism! What I concede here – what the Master Argument succeeds at 
showing – is merely the existence of some epistemic gaps – not the existence of an ontological 
gap. A further step is needed to conclude that physicalism is false; and this further step can be 
resisted. To see this, notice that whether a fact A perspicuously explains a fact B might depend 
on the conceptualization of the facts in question. As far as the notion of perspicuous explanation 
is concerned, it is an open question whether it is possible for some facts A and B, and some 
conceptualizations of A A1 and A2 that B is perspicuously explained by A under 
conceptualization A1, but not under conceptualization A2 (the same considerations apply with 
respect to different conceptualizations of B as well). The physicalist thinks that this is exactly the 
situation with respect to the fact that P, the fact that C, and the fact that E under their different 
conceptualizations. P doesn’t perspicuously explain CPhen but it does perspicuously explain CPhys! 
Similarly, CPhys doesn’t perspicuously explain E, but CPhen does. And CPhen  and CPhys, according 
to the physicalist, express the same fact. To rebut the anti-physicalist, the proponent of the PCS 
merely has to argue that this is conceivable. If it is conceivable then the fact that P doesn’t 
perspicuously explain CPhen doesn’t a priori entail that CPhen is not physical. 
 
27 Non-gappiness constitutes a conceptually necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) condition of 
what Chalmers calls “reductive” explanation. A full definition of reductive explanation is not 
needed here anyway; all that is relevant, from the point of view of the arguments in this paper, is 
the connection between explanation and non-gappiness. 
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The heart of the physicalist position is that there is no a priori reason to rule such a 
situation out – no a priori reason, that is, except the putatively a priori anti-physicalist principles. 
But the PCSs explains why the anti-physicalist principles are mistaken. They are mistaken 
because they presuppose that epistemic gaps always indicate ontological gaps.28 They do not 
take into account the special way in which we think about our phenomenal experiences. Even if 
the world is entirely physical, as a consequence of the unique cognitive profile of phenomenal 
concepts the puzzling epistemic gaps still have to arise. The anti-physicalist’s mistake is 
overreaction. 
At this point the anti-physicalist might object that the scenario invoked by the physicalist 
is indeed inconceivable since the lack of a perspicuous explanation does a priori entail an 
ontological gap between the facts involved. But this argument relies on the original principles 
that the PCS is designed to rebut. Invoking them again – this time arguing that phenomenal 
concept facts do not metaphysically supervene on the physical – doesn’t add anything to the 
original anti-physicalist argument which concluded that phenomenal facts do not metaphysically 
supervene on the physical. As a matter of fact, it merely begs the question. On the constitutional 
account of phenomenal concepts, both explanatory gaps – the one involving P and Q, the other 
involving P and CPhen – arise in virtue of the peculiar nature of phenomenal concepts. The 
physicalist argues that if the conceivability of a physicalist account of phenomenal concepts is 
granted the falsity of the anti-physicalist principles – those same principles that are supposed to 
rule that conceivability out – can be satisfactorily accounted for. Invoking the inconceivability of 
a physicalist account of phenomenal concepts through a reliance on the correctness of the anti-
physicalist principles, the very principles PCS is rebutting,  is – far from being a refutation of the 
PCS – a mere refusal to meet the argument on its own ground.  
Of course, physicalism would remain puzzling and downright incomprehensible if a 
perspicuous physicalist explanation of the epistemic gaps themselves was not possible. The 
crucial element of the PCS is that it provides just such an explanation. It offers the next best 
thing to a perspicuous explanation of Q in terms of P, namely, it offers a perspicuous explanation 
of why we can’t have one. The proponent of the PCS turns things around by showing that a 
purely physical world where the epistemic gaps are explained by the nature of phenomenal 
concepts – rather than by the nature of phenomenality itself – is conceivable. All that is needed to 
show this is that there is no a priori reason to rule out the existence of a purely physical world 
where q=b,29 and where the constitutional account of phenomenal concepts holds.30  
 
28 The principle at issue connects, on Chalmers’ account, a conceptual gap to an ontological gap. 
On the version I am currently discussing, it connects the explanatory gap to an ontological gap. 
There are other – supposedly a priori – principles connecting some epistemic gap with an 
ontological gap; but I cannot discuss them here. 
29 q is a phenomenal property, and b is a physical or functional property. 
 
30 Presumably, a full explanation requires a general theory of concepts and representation, and an 
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Chalmers (2007) charges that the explanatory scheme outlined above is circular. But 
there is nothing viciously circular about the explanation I sketched above. It is true, to rebut the 
anti-physicalist arguments one has to assume that the anti-physicalist principles are false – and so 
do not make physicalism about phenomenal experience and phenomenal concepts inconceivable.  
But this doesn’t make the PCS defective – after all, the strategy is based on an explanation of 
why the anti-physicalist principles are mistaken.31  
Chalmers claims that, on this scheme, no progress can be made by following the PCS 
since the issue of whether the new gap – i.e., the one involving CPhen and P – is compatible with 
physicalism can be raised with the same force as with respect to the original explanatory gap. 
The ontological implications of the gap between CPhen and P have to be denied which comes 
much to the same thing as denying the ontological implications of the original gap between C 
and P. What Chalmers overlooks is that the PCS provides a physicalistic explanation of the 
conceptual/epistemic gaps (including the new gap involving phenomenal concept descriptions) 
and so explains how the anti-physicalist principles can be false despite their intuitive appeal – 
which amounts to more than a mere denial.  
In fact, and this is a key point, Chalmers engages in the same kind of circular 
argumentation against the physicalist that he accuses the physicalist of engaging in. He rebuts the 
PCS by first assuming that the contested principles are true.  
This is a stalemate. Each side can unseat the other side’s core assumption – if they are 
permitted to make their own core assumption. The anti-physicalist appeals to the anti-physicalist 
principles, the physicalist appeals to the conceivability of a purely physical world with 
phenomenality. Both can show that, once granted that one core assumption, their view is 
consistent and can rebut challenges from the other side. Neither side can, without begging the 
question against the opponent, show that the other’s position is untenable. Where you end up 
depends on what you take as your starting point. And, as far as I can see, neither side has a 
privileged start. What this means is that the physicalist can resist the Master Argument. The 
Master Argument is no more able to refute the PCS than the physicalist is able to refute the anti-
physicalist principles. This is a stalemate, as far as this dialectic goes, but a stalemate is enough 
to make physicalism a viable option.  
The situation, however, is puzzling. One would have thought that when it comes to a 
priorities, like the anti-physicalist principles, or the conceivability of physicalism with respect to 
phenomenality, there are a priori ways to justify or refute them. This doesn’t seem to be the case 
 
account of mental processes. I will keep these out of consideration since these things have to be 
in place for a full explanation irrespective of one’s ontological views. 
 
31 Descartes used a similar overall argumentative structure – the Cartesian Circle. As some 
commentators have pointed it out, circularity by itself doesn’t make an argument defective (e.g., 
Loewer, 1981). 
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here. Both claims seem to be self-justificatory; but they are incompatible with each other. I know 
of no principles outside the physicalist and anti-physicalist systems that could settle the issue. 
What we have here is a puzzling symmetry between the two incompatible positions.32  
 
As I have argued elsewhere (Balog 2008) there is no good reason to think that empirical 
evidence can break the tie either. If there is a way to break the stalemate it is by comparing the 
two grand metaphysical/explanatory systems in which each position is embedded. The only way 
empirically equivalent and internally consistent theories can be compared with each other is by 
considerations of simplicity and overall explanatory strength. In the case at hand we need to look 
at the competing accounts of metaphysical necessity, mental causation, meaning, the nature of 
physical properties and consciousness, what fundamental laws exist, etc.33 
 
This is not the place to adjudicate the issue. The conclusion that we can draw from the 
foregoing discussion of the PCS and Chalmers’ Master Argument is that there are no a priori 
ways to decide between the two metaphysical frameworks – except considerations having to do 
with the overall simplicity and explanatoriness of the respective metaphysical frameworks.34 
This is where the ontology wars will be decided, if at all. 
 
32 There are some instances of statements which if true (false) must be a priori true (false) but 
where we lack non question begging a priori ways of deciding the issue. For example, 
mathematical realists typically think that Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis is an instance. But the 
case at hand seems as though it should be a priori decidable by us since it doesn’t involve the 
complexity of the mathematical case. In the face of this kind of stand off one can be tempted to 
the view that there is no fact of the matter (i.e. the relevant statements are neither true nor false) 
or that the dispute is terminological (i.e. the statements are deploying concepts with different 
meanings). But we have seen that the conceivability of physicalism has consequences for 
ontology – for whether physicalism or anti-physicalism is true – and this doesn’t seem to be 
terminological.  
33 On the physicalist side, there are arguments in favor of physicalism that appeal to mental 
causation and the causal closure of physics (Loewer 1995), (Papineau 1995). Loewer and 
Papineau argue that the anti-physicalist is forced into adopting one of these implausible 
positions: epiphenomenalism, causal overdetermination, or denial of the causal closure of 
physics. Hill and McLaughlin (1999), and McLaughlin (2007) argue more generally that there 
are powerful reasons to prefer physicalism as an overall explanatory metaphysics over dualism. 
See also Melnyk (2003) for discussion of a history of successful reduction of higher level 
properties to lower level ones. On the anti-physicalist side, Chalmers, e.g., argues (2002a, 2002b) 
that the CP Principle – and with it, dualism – is required to give a satisfying account of modality.  
 
34 I am not going to decide whether the terminology a priori properly describes such 
considerations. Nothing rides on the terminology.  
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